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Abstract 
Experiment 1 (n=120) was a 3x2x2 analysis of variance 
design, investigating the interaction of the effect of 
cognitive tuning, balance and sex on polarization of 
personality impressions. While balance variables 
influenced polarization it did not mask the different 
polarization effects of the cognitive tuning sets, 
transmission and reception. The checking of positive 
traits outstriped the checking of negative traits by 
a factor of 2 . 25. Males pola rized more than females. 
Experiment 2 (n=40) investigated the interaction of 
tuning, sex and status. Status and sex effects on 
polariza tion were significantly different on transmission 
tuning only. 
B.AL.Al'JCE, COGNITIVE TUHI.(G, STATUS AND 
POSITIVITY BIAS IH COi-11.:mrrcArION 
OF IMPRESSIOIIB 1 
The starting point for this investigation is Feather's 
(1964a) 11Structural Balance Model of Communication Effects." 
This model is a symbolic representation of the basic unit 
of the cognitive structure concerned with communication in 
dyadic interaction. The model takes the viewpoint of one 
of the people in the dyad. The model incorporates sentiment 
relations and composite relations of responsibility and 
indentification between the interactants and the issue of 
communication. Although the model could be called a 
"normative" one it does lave predictive validity. 
(Feather and Armstrong 1967). 
There are 4 elements in this representation of cognitive 
structur•e. A "transmitter" (T) who is the 11 source" of 
the communication, a "receiver" (R) who is the target 
of the communication, an "issue" (I) which is the topic 
of the communication, and then there is the "communication" 
(C) itself. 
When the psycho-logic of the evaluative relationships 
between the elements are upset, the dyad is defined as 
unbalanced. The model as sumes (after Heider, 1958) that 
preceived "imbalance" is psychologically discomforting 
to the interactant, and it motivates him to change the 
structure by some behavioural act at the actual interpersonal 
level (i.e. the nonrepresentational level), to make 
the structure balanced (at the representational level). 
Heider gives the formal definition of balance, although 
I suspect psychologists use their own intuitive psycho-
logic to make predictions within the model. Certainly 
an intuitive grasp of the psycho-logic involved is 
necessary for the model to be meaningful. Heider 
considers only 3-element structures in his definition, 
but the definition is generalizable ton-element 
structures simply by considering each directly-connected 
element, in combinations of three. Heider's definition 
of balance is that for three-element structures, balance 
exists when; 
"all three of the relations are positive or 
when two of the relations are negative and 
one is positive. Imbalance occurs when t wo 
of the relations are positive and one is 
negative. The case of three negative relations 
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is somewhat ambiguous." (Heider, 1958 pp.202-203). 
Feather says about his model that all relations for each 
digraph may be predicted using the principle of structural 
balance (see above) provided that any 3 relations that 
involve the 4 elements (T,C,I,R) of the communication 
structure are given. 
This cursory explication of the model has set the 
stage for the theoretical discussion and the experimental 
situation. However we must also tack in from another 
point of view, that of cognitive tuning (or sets). 
Some definitions are in order. "Cognitive Structure", 
as used here, refers to the way in which a person organises 
all his cognition, (thoughts, feelings, attitudes, percepts). 
"Structure" refers to the relationships between each 
and every other cognitive element. "Cognitive Tuning" 
refers to one particular configuration of cognitive 
elements that is an immediate consequence of, and is, 
in fact, the perception of the immediate psychological 
environment. This process also includes the 
synchronization of the sensory channels, and their 
selective attention to cues in the environment. 
Psychological economy requires that all incoming stimuli 
do not need to be heeded or processed. Both these 
concepts, "cognitive tuning" and "cognitive structure", 
are clearly an inference from what is given in any 
particular perceptual situation and what is represented 
a nd related in an output of information about that 
situation, by a person. 
In 1960, Zajonc postulated t wo types of cognitive 
tuning sets activated in anticipation of dealing with 
information; a set to receive information and a set 
to transmit information. 
Zajonc says this about these particular tuning sets: 
" 1hen a person primarily anticipates receiving 
information he may be expected to activate a 
cognitive structure capable of admitting the 
incoming information. Concomitant with the 
anticipation of receiving information is the 
anticipation of cognitive change. On the 
3 
other hand, anticipation of transmitting 
information should activate structures that may 
serve as a source of potential messages." (Zajonc, 
1 9 60 p • 1 61 ) • 
Zajonc using formal definitions of properties of 
cognitive structure, set out "to examine differences in 
the properties of cognitive structures activated under 
receiving and transmission tuning." (p.161, 1960). 
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In general Zajonc found that cognitive structures activated 
under transmission tuning were; "more rigid, unified 
and organized" (polarized either positively or negatively), 
while those activated under reception tuning were more 
flexible, and less polarized. (p.166). 
Cohen (1961) provided further evidence for the 
validity of these properties of the tuning sets, and in 
effect, evidence for the existence of these sets themselves. 
Cohen used contradictory information to maximise the 
effect of the different tuning sets. He asked his 
subjects to read a list of 10 contradictory traits and 
form an impression of the person they described. Half 
of the subjects were told they had to tell someone about 
their impressions (transmission tuning), the other half 
were told they would listen to someone else giving 
their impressions of the stimulus person (reception 
tuning). After reading the list of traits, subjects 
were asked to write a description of the stimulus person. 
Cohen found that descriptions written under transmission 
tuning were more polarized (Cohen used ratings), either 
positively or negatively. Descriptions written under 
reception tuning were more "balanced" and "integrated". 
Under reception tuning subjects seemed to suspend 
evaluation of the stimulus person. 
What accounts for this effect? A functionalist 
approach seems most adequate in answering this question. 
As Cohen has pointed out, transmission, "requires a 
tight and well-bound cognitive package which can be 
communicated to others." On the other hand, in receiving 
information it is "economical" to expect possible change 
in the structuring of cognitions in the relevant area. 
It is "economical" in that additional inf'ormation, 
especially from a well respected source, may necessitate 
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a change in the gestalt or structure of this area. 
Attitudes seem to be output, or concomitants of the output, 
from the gestalt or structure. (output here is equivalent 
to relating self to the objective referent of the gestalt). 
Also it is an established finding in the area of attitude 
change, that att itude chang e is stressful and requires 
considerable psychological effort. Putting all this 
together then, if attitude change is to be expected 
from a change in gestalt, and if this concomitant is 
stressful and requires much mental energy expenditure, 
and if change in gestalt or structure is expected then, 
in the interests of conserving mental energy it would 
be expedient to inhibit attitude formation until no 
more gestalt changes are expected. Extrapolating from 
this we would expect inhibition of outward communication 
(forming attitudes) while input communication was in 
progress, not just because of possible interference 
effects but from the fact that the costs of short-term 
attitude formation are too high. 
Now, having explicated these two separate areas of 
theory, we can look to their interaction. The polarization 
or nonpolarization of impressions under cognitive tuning 
takes place along an evaluative dimension that is highly 
positive at one end and highly negative at the other end. 
In absolute terms, polarization of an impression 
will make it all positive or all negative, nonpolarization 
will make an impression neither completely positive nor 
completely negative. Confirmed predictions from balance 
theory make it clear that perceived evaluation of the 
issue of communication by the other person in the dyad 
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inf'luences either one's attitude towards the issue of 
communication or one's attitude towards the other person. 
The essential question is; will this balance effect, 
mask or cancel the different polarization effects of 
transmission and reception tuning? 
In applying the balance model, it is assumed here, 
that a persons expectancy to communicate with an unknown 
other is positively unit-forming and will give rise to 
perceived reciprocal, positive affect . 
It is also assumed that in this dyadic communication 
situation, there is positive unit-formation between 
each interactant and the communication because for T, 
it is his communication, and for R because R is committed 
to hear it. 
Given the above relationships, and one person's 
perception of the other person's evaluation of I, 
Feather 's extension of the balance model predicts the 
former's evaluation of I. 
In terms of hypotheses then, the balance model would 
predict: that when R's attitude toward I is known (by T), 
Twill modify his communication so as to make it consonant 
Nith R's attitude, and that when T's attitude toward I 
is known (by R), R will modify his attitude toward I so 
as to make it consonant with T's communication. 
It must be noted that the two hypotheses above are 
not directly tested in this study. However later 
h~rpotheses assume these two hypotheses to be true and their 
validity provides evidence in support of the hypotheses 
mentioned here. 
Where all the above relationships hold, excepting 
that the other persons evaluation of I is not known by 
either interactant, the requirements for prediction by 
Feather's extension of the balance model, are not met. 
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(these requirements are mentioned above). However, if we 
make "extra-balance" assumptions, it is possible to 
predict that the "uncontrolled other person evaluation of 
I" (U) situation will resemble the "other person likes 
I" (L) situation more than the "other person dislikes 
I" (D) situation. Goffman (1959) derived the principle 
that people tend to assume good faith in other people's 
"self-presentations." Zajonc (1968) has reviewed the 
literature concerning a general bias towards positivity 
in our representations of the environment. From the 
above we might infer that, in general, people will 
assume the good intentions of others until they have 
reason to believe otherwise. Assuming this to be true, 
then we would predict that the outcome, in situations 
where "other person evaluation of I" was not specified 
(U) would be more like the outcome in situations where 
the "other person likes I" (L) than the outcome in 
situations where the "other person dislikes I" (D). 
Therefore the following hypothesis was derived: that 
the effects of polarization in "uncontrolled other person 
evaluation of I" (U) conditions will have greater similarity 
to the polarization effects of "other person like of' I" (L) 
conditions than to the polarization effects of "other 
person dislike o:f I" (D). 
Cognitive tuning and balance interaction. While it was 
expected that the different tuning sets would have their 
distinctive polarization effects when the "other person 
evaluation of I" was left uncontrolled, it was expected 
that this effect would be masked by the induced perception 
of the "other person" "liking" or "disliking" I. It was 
also expected that where polarization occurred, the 
direction of polarization would be determined by the 
direction in which the other person was perceived as 
evaluating I. Also it was expected that the overall 
polarization effect would be increased (i.e. made 
relatively more extreme) by the perception of the "other 
person's" evaluation of I. ie can state these 
expectancies in propositional form by the following 
hypotheses: 
While nonpolarization will occur in the reception set 
this will be masked when the other persons evaluation 
of I is polarized. 
Polarization of impressions will occur under transmission 
tuning, in the direction of perceived receiver evaluation 
of I. 
The overall polarization of the transmission condition 
will be increased by the perception of the other 
person's evaluation of I. 
Cognitive Complexity. As mentioned previously, Zajonc 
(1960) in his original paper on cognitive tuning found 
that, "transmitters activate cognitive structures which 
are more differentiated and more complex •••••••• than 
those activated by receivers." (1960 p.166). Zajonc 
also found that the impressions of transmitters were 
relatively "more rigid" and polarized than those of 
receivers. (1960 p.161). On the other hand, there 
is a body of literature summarized by Crockett suggesting 
that subjects high in cognitive complexity are more 
likely than those low in cognitive complexity: 
p. 68). 
"(a) to use both favourable and unfavourable 
constructs in their descriptions of 
aquaintances and (b) to entertain the 
possibility of unbalanced interpersonal 
relationships among their associates." ( 1965 
8 
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While this generalization is not designed to be situation 
specific or action specific but rather a trans-situational 
personality trait, it does seem, on the face of it, a 
contradiction of Zajonc's findings. However on further 
reflection there is a difference. In reception tuning 
relative nonpolarization seems to arrive from a "suspension" 
in judgement. The functional explanation of the "suspension" 
of judgement in reception tuning as mentioned earlier, 
is that attitude formation is inhibited until all 
information is in to save unnecessary change and hence 
unnecessary effort. It is clear that the requirements 
of the reception tuning situation underlying 
nonpolarization here differs considerably :from that which 
underlies nonpolarization in aquaintance description. 
The former refers more to a process (i.e. tuning), the 
latter to a structure. We can however test Zajonc 's 
:finding that transmitters activate more differentiated 
and complex cognitive structures. Thus we hypothisize: 
that transmitters activate more complex cognitive structures 
than do receivers. 
In a monograph entitled, "The Attitudinal Effects of 
Mere Exposure", Zajonc (1968) says: 
"The strength and pervasiveness of the 
relationship between word frequency and 
meaning - the evaluation aspect of meaning 
in particular - is truly remarkable" (p.2). 
Zajonc cites the Thorndike - Lorge count (1944). 
" ••• The word "happiness" occurs 761 times, 
"unhappiness" occurs only 49 times. "Beauty" 
is to be found at least 41 times as often as 
"ugliness" and "weal th" outdoes 
":poverty" by a factor of 1. 6. e "laugh" 
2.4 times as often as we "cry"; we "love" 
almost 7 times more often than we "hate"; 
we are "in" at least 5 times more often 
than we are "out" •••• (:p.2) . 
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"While they are unfaithful in representing 
reality, word frequencies are extraordinarily 
accurate in representing real values •••• (p.3). 
Zajonc reports a correlation between rated occupational 
:prestige of 24 job names and the log frequency of their 
usage as subjects, (topics). There is a correlation 
of . 33 between "racial-distance quotients" and the usage 
of the relevant ethnic labels (:p.12). Along the same 
lines, but in interpersonal relations we might expect 
that :people in general, assume the good intentions of 
others until they have reason to believe otherwise (Goffman). 
It will be remembered that this :postulate was an assumption 
made in an earlier theoretical :prediction. It was 
hypothesised then: 
that there will be a positive relationship between the 
favourability of the impression of I and a measure of 
complexity (differentiation) in the subjects impression 
of I. 
We also might expect from the discussion , :particularly 
from Zajonc's findings, that there will be a checking 
bias towards :positively valued traits . ~e shall hypothesize: 
that , overall (across all conditions) , there will be a 
tendency to attribute more favourability than unfavourability 
to I . 
Sex differences . The original hypothesis was stimulated 
by the knowledge of the finding of extreme female response 
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in another study conducted at the University of Waikato. 
The interpretation of these findings led to the hypothesis 
that females tended to perceive things more in "black 
and white" (i.e. in discrete categories). This author 
was interested in the generality of this sex difference 
and in particular, if it extended to personality impression 
formation (Hamid, 1968). After formulating the simple 
hypothesis that females would polarize their impressions 
of a hypothetical person more than males, and after 
conducting the experiment, it was discovered there was 
a considerable body of literature on sex differences 
in response style. This literature was found to be 
use:f'ul in interpreting the results. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
H1a: That when R's attitude toward I is known, (T) will 
modify his communication so as to make it consonant with 
R's attitude. 
H1b: That when T's attitude toward I is known, (R) will 
modify his attitude toward I so as to make it consonant 
with T's communication. 
i.e. in operational terms; 
Subjects in other-person-like-of-I condition will 
check more positive traits than negative traits. 
Subjects in other-person-dislike-of-I condition will 
check more negative traits than positive traits. 
H2: Tb.at the effects of polarization in "uncontrolled 
other person evaluation of I" (U) conditions will have 
greater similarity to the polarization effects of "other 
:person like of I" (L) conditions than to the polarization 
effects of "other person dislike of I". ( D). 
i.e. in operational terms; 
That there ill be no significant differences between 
U conditions and L conditions, in the difference between 
the number of positive and negative traits checked, but 
that there will be significant differences betveen U 
conditions and D conditions in the difference bet een 
the number of positive and negative traits. 
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H3a: That while nonpolarization ill occur in the 
reception set this ,ill be masked when "the other person's" 
evaluation of I is polarized. 
H3b: The ~asking of nonpolarization ,ill be in the 
direction of the other person's evaluation of I. 
i.e. in operational terms; 
Considering reception conditions only: 
(a) that where the other person's evaluation of I is 
uncontrolled there will be no significant difference 
between the number of positive and negative traits 
checked. 
(bi) that where the other person ' s evaluation of I is 
positive (L) there will be a significant difference 
between the number of positive and negative traits checked, 
in the direction of liking I. 
(bii) that ,here the other person's evaluation of I is 
negative (D) there will be a significant difference 
between the number of positive and negative traits 
checked, in the direction of disliking I. 
H4: That polarization of impressions will occur under 
transmission tuning, in the direction of the other person 's 
evaluation of I. 
i.e. in operational terms; 
considering transmission conditions only: 
(a) that for all transmission conditions there will be 
a significant difference between the number of positive 
and negative traits checked. 
(b) that where "other person evaluation of I" is positive 
there will be significantly more positive traits checked 
than negative traits checked. 
(c) that where "other person evaluation of I" is negative 
there will be significantly more negative traits checked 
than positive traits checked. 
H5: That the overall (across conditions) polarization 
of the transmission condition will be increased by the 
perception of the other persons evaluation of I. 
i.e. in operational terms; 
that within transmission conditions there ~ill be greater 
discrepancy betveen the number of positive and negative 
traits checked in controlled "other person evaluation of 
I" conditions (L) and (D) than in uncontrolled "other 
person evaluation of I" conditions (U). 
H6: That transmitters activate more complex cognitive 
structures than do receivers. 
i.e. in operational terms; 
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that there will be a significantly greater number of traits 
checked in transmission conditions than in reception 
conditions. 
H7: That there will be a positive relationship betveen 
the favourability of the impression of I and a measure 
of complexity (differentiation) in the subjects impression 
of that person. 
i.e. in operational terms; 
that using the ratio of the number of positive to negative 
traits checked as the index of favourability or unfavourability 
----- - - --
to find the 10 most favourable impressions and the 10 
most unfavourable impressions to use as a dichotomy of 
evaluation, there will be more traits checked in the 
"favourable" than in the "unfavourable" group . 
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The predict ion should also hold using the II other 
person liking of I" conditions as the index of favourable 
impressions, and "other person dislike of I" conditions 
as the index of unfavourable impressions . This holds, 
given the validity of Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4. 
H8: That , overall (across all conditions) , there will 
be a tendency to attribute more favourability than 
unfavourability to I . 
i.e . in operational terms; 
that overall, there will be significantly more positive 
than negative traits checked. 
H9: That females ill tend to polarize their impressions 
more extremely than males. 
i . e. in operational terms; 
that f emales will have higher discrepancies between the 
number of positive traits checked and the number of' negative 
traits checked, than males. 
Subjects 
EXPERIMENT I 
METHOD 
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The groups of subjects consisted of 60 males and 60 
females attending the district high school of a town 
some ten miles or so from Hamilton . They were 
drawn mainly from the fourth form, although some fifth 
formers were included. 
13- 16 years. 
Procedure 
The age range was approximately 
All experimental sessions were conducted in the 
same small class-room within the school, during regular 
school hours. There were 12 experimental sessions 
corresponding to the 12 experimental conditions, there 
being 10 boys or 10 girls in all conditions. 
The experimenter (E) introduced himself as an honours 
student who was conducting a project in fulfilment of 
his thesis requirements, and that he was interested 
in peoples impressions of others. It was mentioned 
that not much was known about impressions of people 
despite its all-pervasiveness in everyday life. Examples 
of the importance of establishing knowledge in this area 
were given and E concluded the introduction by pointing 
to the impression formation that was undoubtedly going 
on while he was speaking (i . e . impressions formed about 
E himself) . As in Cohen's introduction, the present 
proce dure was designed to raise subjects motivation to 
perform the experimental task . 
Subjects task 
All subjects were told by E, "You are going to hear 
a list of characteristics that apply to someone your age. 
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What I want you to do is to listen to these characteristics 
and get a good idea of what kind of :person he/she2 is. 
Don't try to relate these adjectives to each other just 
let them f'ill out your picture of this :person. 11 
Induction of' Cognitive Tuning: Those in the transmission 
conditions were told: "Af'ter you have listened to these 
characteristics your job will be to communicate to 
other boys/girls who are taking part in this experiment, 
all you can about Kevin/Jan. These people who should 
be here in about 5 minutes (at this stage E looked 
worriedly at his watch) have done the same thing as you 
are going to do. Those in reception conditions were 
told: 11.Af'ter you have listened to these characteristics 
you will receive the impressions about Kevin/Jan from 
other boys/girls. These boys/girls have also taken part 
in this experiment. I want you to meet these people 
and listen to their impressions of' Kevin/Jan." 
Those conditions which required the induced :perception 
of :positive evaluation of' Kevin/Jan by the other :person 
in the communication situation were told: "Actually we 
have found that they tend to like Kevin/Jan." Those 
conditions which required the induced :perception of 
negative evaluation of Kevin/Jan by the other person 
were told: "Actually we have found that they tend to 
dislike Kevin/Jan." 
All subjects were then told: 11This is not a test of 
memory or intelligence, and so forth, so don't memorize 
the list of characteristics. Try to get a general :picture 
of what sort of individual Kevin/Jan is, so that; 
transmission the other :person will be able to understand 
f'ully your impressions of' him/her, 
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reception you will be able to understand fully the 
impressions about Kevin/Jan of the other people . Alright, 
here are the characteristics." At this point E SiVitched 
the tape recorder on and a male voice recited the 
folloving characteristics in a monotone at 2 second 
intervals. 
very friendly 
extremely generous 
ruthless 
extremely dependable 
overly conceited 
very kind 
scheming 
very cold 
highly loyal 
insincere 
Af'ter switching the tape recorder off, E went to the door 
and looked out (to where subjects could not see and 
here these "other people" would presumably arrive) and 
while shutting the door, E looked at his ¥atch and 
then returned to the front of the room. Ethen said: 
"It appears these other people haven't arrived - but 
it doesn't matter yet because there is a little booklet 
to f'ill out first." E handed out the booklets and then 
while subjects filled these in, acted out anxious 
anticipation of the arrival of these "other people". 
When everyone had answered their booklets, when the bell 
for the next period of instruction had rung, (each 
experimental session coincided with one normal period 
of instI'uction) and the "other people still hadn't 
arrived, E apologised and said that these people still 
hadn't come but added (with a note ct: optimism) that 
he didn't think it would affect vrhat they had done. 
Then ith a final atmosphere of drama E said this: 
"There is just one very important thing I must ask of 
you before you go - it's very important - in fact 
vital - it is not to tell your friends what has gone 
on in here just now - not even the fact these other 
people didn't arr ive - or the fact that I went over 
to the door and looked out to see if they vere here. 
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If people ask , just say you had to fill out forms about 
this person rhose characteristics you heard on the 
tape (enough to satisfy but not enough to give the 
show away for the asker, and a stock armatarium, a tool, 
for subjects to rebut inquisitors). This is an 
extremely important request. If you don't heed it, 
you will have wasted my time, your time and the schools 
time. The reason is that I'll be doing the same thing 
with others in the school and if they know anything 
about it prior to doing it, it will affect their results. 
It just takes one of you to be overheard in conversation 
and it ruins it for everybody. O.K. will you help 
me in this? (Yes) good." .fhile E was thanking the 
subjects, subjects were rushing off late to their 
next lesson. 
Rationale 
There ffere several reasons why this later embellishment 
of the deception was necessary, all relating to the 
nature of the testing situation. "The other people who 
vere about to arrive" (the others) r;ere necessary because 
E did not rvant subjects to "believe that "the others" 
were pupils in the same school. E 's interpretation 
of the polarization effect in transmission tuning 
involves an evaluation of self concern in the face to 
face transmission of information. If "the others" 
were perceived as fellow pupils of the same school , 
it was felt that this might detract from the conditions 
conducive to polarization. 
The reason for not debriefing each batch of subjects 
after their experimental session, and for the dramatic 
plea for secrecy at the conclusion of each session 
also relates to the nature of the school situation. 
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Because of time and expense involved, administrative 
difficulties, and the enormous problem of E standardization, 
all experimental sessions could not be conducted 
simultaneously, and in fact extended over 2 days plus 
one period of the third day. For most part of the 
day, a school operates a s a closed institution. ith 
such characteristics as single authority, tight 
scheduling of activities, treatment of people as groups 
rather than as individuals, rationalization of enforced 
activities under a single rational plan, the school, 
for the few hours of the day in which it exists, becomes 
a "total institution". .An added feature of such total 
institutions is the proliferation of an informal social 
communication network. It was this network E was 
concerned about, and in particular, the possible feed 
back through the informal social communication network 
of the uniformity of the "accidental contingencies" 
occuring in experimental sessions, the possible deduction 
from this to infer the deception and so on to the 
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contamination of potential subjects. Had the deception 
extended over any appreciable amount of time, the 
valencies for not discussing this area of subjective 
uncertainty would have diminished and the deception 
would have come unstuck . 3 As it was it did not come 
unstuck and it is likely this can be attributed to 
the success of the plea for secrecy and the length 
of time over which the experimental sessions continued. 
After all experimental sessions had been completed, 
a cyclostyled debriefing sheet explaining the experiment 
was distributed among all subjects and a more extensive 
account was given to teachers. 
Description of the measuring instrument 
The measuring instrument used in both studies consisted 
of a quarto-sized booklet. The coversheet was entitled 
"Impression Formation Data Booklet." Below this was 
an injunction to the subject not to communicate with 
his neighbour and spaces for the following demographic 
variables: name, sex, course (of instruction), and 
experimental group designation (e.g . group No.3) . 
On page 2 was the title "Adjective Check List" and 
below, "place a small tick (.;) beside all those adjectives 
that you think apply to the person you have formed an 
impression about . (see over the page) e . g . If the 
adjective "fat" applied, you would put a small tick 
beside it on the line provided thus: 11fat • Y. . 11 
On the following page appeared the 75 most positive 
and 75 most negative items in the Gough Heilbrun, 
Adjective Check List . They were arranged in alphabetical 
order and there were 5 deletions as these adjectives 
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were considered culturally inappropriate. 
Page 4 contained 5 items. 1, was a question check ing 
up on the success of the cognitive tuning induction, 
and was cribbed from Cohen's 1961 study. Question 2 
was also taken from Cohen and was included merely to 
verify his findings concerning desire for more information, 
Question 3 was a check on the perception of the other 
person's evaluation of the subject of communication. 
Item 4 required the subject to r a te his satisfaction 
in performing the experimental task on a 7-point scale 
from "satisfied" to "dissatisfied." Item 5 was open 
ended and intended for catharsis by the subject and 
contained the simple directive, "any comments?". 
Derivation of the Stimulus Trait List: Cohen used both 
a high contradiction and a low contradiction list of 
tra its, obtaining greater polarization effects with the 
high contradiction condition. It was decided that a 
high contradiction list of tra its would be used but 
that Cohen's "high contradiction" list might not be 
appropriate to a New Zealand sample as previous work 
with trait labels in New Zealand has suggested (Hamid 
1967). Thus a 7-point Social Desirability Rating Scale 
of traits including those of Cohen's high contradiction 
list, was administered to introductory psychology 
students. It was found that Cohen's list compared very 
favourably in extremity, with the most extreme traits. 
What is more Cohen's high contradiction list was not 
distorted in any direction, that is, the sum of the 
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mean ratings of the positive traits served to cancel 
out the sum of the mean ratings of the negative traits. 
The rating scale for the 30 traits had an overall test -
retest correlation of .679 n=10. (Spearman Rank 
Order Correlation Coefficient). However, it was 
realised that while it is consistent to attribute to 
one person, traits inconsistent in terms of social 
desirability, it is not consistent to attribute to 
one person, logically inconsistent traits. For example, 
a person can be both intelligent and ruthless but he 
cannot be both warm-hearted and cold-hearted - at 
least in naive personality theory. It was felt that 
logical contradiction might facilitate the polarizing 
effect in transmission. In an impromptu survey, Cohen's 
"high contradiction" list was compared with a comparable 
list containing the most extreme traits in terms of 
social desirability, for their logical contradiction. 
Cohen's list was rated significantly more "logically 
contradictory" than the other list ( X 2 = 20. 0 
p < • 001 using the score for the other trait list as E). 
Considering this and the favourable comparability of 
the two lists on social desirability, it was decided, 
in the interests of preserving the conditions supposedly 
facilitative of polarization, to use Cohen's original 
"high contradiction" list in this study. 
Statistical Analysis 
While Zajonc and Cohen used parametric statistics 
to test the significance of their findings (and hence 
have assumed the normality of the distribution of 
their index of polarization), it was decided not to 
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make this assumption. It is quite possible that 
organization of cognitive structures along the evaluative 
dimension is normally distributed. However the findings 
of Zajonc himself, and his review of the literature 
mentioned earlier (1968) on the frequency of terms 
with favourable connotation in communicative and non-
communicative behaviour would suggest it wasn't normally 
distributed. Another reason for not assuming normality 
is the nature of the index used to estimate polarization 
which differs from that of Zajonc and Cohen. While 
Zajonc used card sorting and Cohen used paragraph ratings, 
I have used an Adjective Check List. The bias of 
answering sets when using simple response items has been 
well documented (L.J. Cronbach). 
Inspection of the data revealed that there was not 
enough internal homogeneity to warrant the use of an 
analysis of variance model, so, a;(. 2 one-sample test 
was used to assess the significance of differences. 
The .05 level was selected as the region of rejection. 
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RESULTS 
The Post Experimental Questions 
Question 1 failed in its intent, although it was 
taken directly from Cohen's study. Its failure to 
check on the success of the cognitive tuning inductions 
was attributed to the lack of the sophistication of the 
subjects (compared ith Cohen's sample of College students) 
and the possible ambiguity of the question in the light 
of the complexity of the experimental situation. However, 
even if the question did adequately measure the subjects 
perception of this part of the experimental situation 
and the results indicated that subjects did not perceive 
the relevant experimental variables, it would not 
necessarily reflect on the success of the manipulation. 
If intake of the information necessary to perform the 
experimental task was received at a less than self-
conscious level, the subject would probably not be 
able to verbalize the cognitive set with which he 
carried out his experimental task. Question 2 was 
also taken directly from Cohen's study and was designed 
to attempt to replicate Cohen's general finding that 
subjects in reception tuning desired more information 
than those in transmission tuning, and to see if the 
other-person's-evaluation-I (Kevin/Jan) affected this 
result. No significant difference was found between 
the different manipulations of the variables, sex, 
tuning, or other-person's-evaluation-of-I. Question 3, 
checking on success of perceived other-person's evaluation-
of-I however, was successful. (Refer to Table 1). 
A ,X..2 one sample test using the mea n checking response 
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for that category as the "expected" value was used 
to test differences. The "like 11 category was checked 
significantly more than average by the other-:person-
likes-I condition subjects and significantly less than 
average by the other- person-dislikes-I condition subjects, 
and not significantly different from a chance outcome 
by uncontrolled other-person-evaluation-of-I condition 
subjects . 
The "dislike" category was checked significantly 
more than average by subjects in the other- :person-
dislikes-I condition, significantly less than average 
by subjects in the other-person-likes- I condition, and 
not significantly different from a chance outcome by 
uncontrolled other-person-evaluation-of-I. The "neither 
like nor dislike" category :produced no significant 
differences across evaluation conditions. We can, 
therefore, accept the validity of the induced 
:perception of the other-person-evaluation-of-I where 
this was controlled. Question 4 required a checking 
response on a 7-:point scale of satisfaction in 
:performing the experimental task. No significant 
differences between experimental conditions were found 
on rating of satisfaction. 
Main Findings 
It will be remembered that :polarization was 
operationally defined as the absolute discrepancy 
between the number of :positive and negative traits checked 
on the Adjective Check List. The overall results are 
summarized in Table 2. 
TABLE 1 
?(,2 VALUES FOR DIFFERENCES IN 
OTHER-PERSON-EVALUATION-OF-I CONDITIONS 
FOR CATEGORY CHECKING IN 
QUESTION 3 
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Response Category 
Other-person-evaluation-of-I 
Uncontrolled Like Dislike 
Like 5. 69 * 6. 50 * 
Dislike 4.75 * 13.39 ** 
Neither 1.47 0.53 0.24 
** p < .001 (one-tailed) d.f. = 2 
* p < .01 (one-tailed) 
TABLE 2 
ME.AN POLARIZATION FOR INTERACTION 
BETWEEN COGNITIVE TUNING, SEX, AND 
OTHER-PERSON-EVALUATION-OF-I. 
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Cognitive Tuning Sex 
Other-person-evaluation-of-I 
Uncontrolled Like Dislike 
Transmission Male 79.45 94.50 68. 70 
Female 83.15 69.80 45.25 
Reception Male 68.90 75.55 52.60 
Female 57.90 58.45 32.00 
Note. - N for each cell= 10 
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects in other-person-
like-of-I conditions would check more positive traits, 
while subjects in other-person-dislike-of-I conditions 
would check more negative traits. 
A -:X, 2 One Sample Test was used to ascertain the 
significance of the differences represented in Table 3, 
using the mean of the two values in each condition 
as the expected value in both cases. A one-tailed 
test of significance indicated that for both positive 
and negative trait checking the observed differences 
are significant at beyond the .001 level of significance. 
The fact that these differences are still significant 
beyond the .001 level when a tro-tailed test is used, 
attests to the highly significant nature of these 
findings. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be no 
significant differences in polarization between the 
uncontrolled other-person-evaluation-of-I (U) conditions 
and the other-person-positive-evaluation-of-I (L) 
conditions, but that there would be a significant 
difference in polarization between the uncontrolled 
other-person-negative-evaluation-of-I (D) conditions. 
Reference to Table 2 indicates the mean polarization 
scores for each evaluation condition, across all 
other variables: D=72.85; L=74.58; D=49.64. A ?C, 2 
One Sample Test was used to test the significance of 
the relevant differences. As was predicted there was 
no significant difference in polarization between 
U and L conditions ( 'X., 2 = 0.040 n.s.). There was 
however a significant difference with D conditions as 
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TABLE 3 
The number of positive and negative 
traits checked in Land D conditions 
L D 
Positive traits checked 815 603 x2 = 15.85 * 
Negative traits checked 287 452 x2 = 18. 22 * 
Note d.f. = 1 *P < .001 
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also predicted ( X, 2 = 10.85. p <. .001 d.f. = 1 ). 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. In their original formulation 
hypotheses 3 and 4 were operationalised in absolute 
terms, e.g. Hypothesis 3 stated that " ••• nonpolarization 
will occur in the reception set ••• "; Hypothesis 4 
stated that " ••• polarization of impressions will 
occur under transmission, in the direction of the 
other-person' s-evalua ti on-of-I. •• 11 • It was expected 
that the overall mean of polarization scores would be 
close to zero, although on the positive side. Hypothesis 
8 indicates we did expect there to be a bias towards 
the positive attributes, but not so overwhelmingly as 
it turned out. There was relatively little negative 
polarization ( a lthough it did occur). The negative 
other-person-evaluation-of-I had the effect of merely 
depressing (on the whole) positive polarization. 
Bearing this in mind then, we can examine the direction 
of the predicted differences. Hypotheses 3 and 4 
predicted a differential effect on polarization by the 
induction of the two different cognitive tuning sets, 
transmission and reception, where the other-person-
evaluation-of-I was left uncontrolled (u). By 
reference to Figures 1 and 2 we can see that the direction 
of the difference is in the predicted direction. Using 
the mean of the opposite condition as the expected 
value , the r;x,., 2 One Sample Test of significance rejects 
the null hypothesis that the two scores are from the 
same population. ( ?(, 2 = 4.19 d.f., p < .01 one tailed 
test). Reference to Figure 2 illustrates the similarity 
of the difference in polarization bet:een transmission 
and reception, for both sexes. A higher degree of 
polariza tion in the transmission condition than in 
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Fig. 2 . The overall polarization effect of transmission 
and reception tuning for males and females 
~--------------- -------
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the reception condition was borne out across all other-
person-evaluation conditions. In no case, across 
evaluation conditions, is the transmission polarization 
smaller than the comparable (for sex) reception 
polarization. This is quite remarkable considering 
the considerable fluctuation of polarization across 
the different evaluation conditions. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 also made predictions concerning 
the direction of the differences caused by the different 
other-person-evaluation-of-I conditions . By referring 
to Figure 1 it is possible to observe that in all cases 
the mean polarization ranks in the like- other- person-
evaluation-of-I exceed the mean polarization ranks in 
the "dislike" condition, as predicted. Using the 
comparable opposite evaluation score as the expected (E) 
value we get the following values for --X,2 One Sample 
Test. 
Male Transmission X, 2 = 9.69 d . f.=1., p < .001 
Male Reception x2 = 1 o. 01 d.f .=1., p <. .001 
Female Transmission x2 = 13.32 d.f.=1., p < .001 
Female Reception ~2 = 21.86 d.f.=1., p < .001 
(all tests here one-tailed. p < . 001 when two-
tailed test). 
Also in three of the four cases the mean polarization 
ranks in the "like" condition exceed those in the 
"uncontrolled" evaluation condition, as predicted 
(refer to Fig. 1) . Again , using the comparable opposite 
evaluation score as the expected value we get the following 
value for ?{2 One Sample Test . 
Male Transmission X.,,2 = 2.40 d . f.=1 . , p < • 01 
Male Reception ?<,2 = 0.59 d.f.=1., n.s. 
Female Transmission ~ = 2.56 d.f.=1., p< .01 
Female Reception ~ 2 = 0 . 04 d. f . =1 . , n . s. 
(all tests here one- tailed) . 
Clearly, Female transmission is aberrant compared with 
the other conditions. It is evident from Figure 1 that 
the mean polarization ranks for the negative evaluation 
conditions are smaller than the comparable scores in the 
uncontrolled evaluation conditions. This was also in 
the predicted direction. Using the same procedure 
as previously, the following ?C..2 values were computed. 
:Male Transmission X 2 = 1. 69 d. f. =1., p < . 01 
'Y 2 Male Reception ' \.., = 5.05 d.f.=1., p < .025 
Female Transmission 
Female Reception 
(all tests one-tailed 
test). 
,v 2 
I"-' = 31.74 d.f.=1., p < .001 
x.,2 = 24.33 d.f.=1., p < .001 
p < • 001 when two-tailed 
By reference to Figure 2, it is possible to observe 
the overall effects of other-person-evaluation-of-I. 
We get the following X 2 values for the differences. 
Uncontrolled/Like ?(2 = 0.0401 d.f.=1., n.s. 
Uncontrolled/Dislike % 2 = 1 o. 85 d. f. =1., p < • 001 
2 Like/Dislike X = 12. 53 d. f. =1., p < • 001 
( all tests one-tailed p < . 001 when two-tailed 
test). 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the overall (across 
conditions) polarization of the transmission condition 
will be increased by the perception of other-person's-
evaluation-of-I. This hypothesis, like hypotheses 3 and 
4, suffers from the fact that the mean overall 
polarization was not located near zero. This hypothesis 
was tested by computing the deviation of the mean ranks 
for each evaluation condition, from the total transmission 
mean rank; combining the "like" and "dislike" deviations 
into a "controlled evaluation" mean; and then comparing 
this mean with the mean for uncontrolled evaluation. 
It was found, according to this operation, that the 
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controlled evaluation conditions polarized more extremely 
than uncontrolled evaluation conditions as predicted. 
Using the opposite mean as the expected value a 2 
One Sample Test proved that this difference was highly 
significant. 
2 ( X,: = 11.12 d .f.=1., p < 
( p < 
.001, one-tailed) 
.001, two-tailed test) 
We may conclude that perceived other-person-evaluation-
of-I tends to increase polarization in transmission. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that transmitters would activate 
more complex cognitive structures than would receivers. 
It will be remembered, that differentiation (number of 
traits checked) was taken to be the criterion of complexity. 
It was found that transmitters checked significantly 
more traits than receivers as predicted. 
( % 2 = 120.35 d.f .=1., p < .001, one-tailed) 
( p < .001, two-tailed) 
We may conclude then that transmitters activate more 
complex structures than do receivers. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that there, ould be a positive 
relationship between the favourability of the impression 
of I and a measure of complexity (differentiation) in 
subjects impression of that person. It will be remembered 
that it was decided to use the 10 most favourable and 
the 10 most unfavourable impression for a dichotomy to 
test the above prediction. A X 2 One Sample Test 
using the opposite category value as E, indicated that 
the obtained difference was not significant. 
( ;(, 2 = 1 • 04 d. f. = 1 • , n. s • o<.. = O • O 5) 
The alternative operationalization of this hypothesis, 
taking all impressions formed under L conditions as 
"favourable" and all impressions formed under D conditions 
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as 11 uni'avourable11 , was also un.frui tful . 
Hypothesis 8 states that overall (across all conditions) 
there will be a tendency to attribute more favourability 
than uni'avourability to I . There is no need to test 
statistically for the difference between the nu..~ber of 
positive and negative traits checked. The checking of 
positively valued traits outstripped the checking of 
negatively valued traits by a factor of 2 . 25 . In 
only one of the conditions (a "dislike" condition) did 
the total number of negative traits checked exceed that 
of positive traits . 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that females would tend to 
polarize their impressions more extremely than males. 
At first glance (see Figure 2) it seems that the 
prediction is not only disconi'irmed but contradicted, 
a difference in the opposite direction. A X. 2 One 
Sample Test, using the other-sex score as the expected 
value reveals that this difference is not significant . 
( ;C, 2 = 3. 97 d . f . =1 ., n . s . ) 
However closer examination reveals something more complex, 
(see Figure 1) . In the uncontrolled evaluation condition, 
the mean polarization rank for females is 83 . 15 compared 
with 79 . 45 for males , a difference that is not significant . 
( ~ 2 = 0. 17 d . f . =1) . In female transmission, 
controlling other- person-evaluation- of- I reduces 
polarization considerably. Female reception however , 
resembles more closely the profiles of male reception 
and to a lesser extent, male transmission. It seems that 
sex differences in polari zation under reception tuni ng are 
mainly quant i tative, the profiles resembling each other 
across the different other- person- evaluation-of-I conditions. 
However, under transmission tuning, there is little 
resemblance in profiles of male polarization and female 
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polarization. 
It appears from Figure 1 that controlled other-
person-evaluation-of-I serves to decrease the 
polarization differences of tra~smission and reception 
tuning for females rhile the opposite effect is observed 
for males . 
( ?(.,2 = 4.44 d. f. =1., p < .05 t m-tailed). 
However when other-person-evaluation-of-I is not 
controlled, females show greater transmission-reception 
differences in polarization than males. 
( ';;(.2 = 15.29 d.f.=1., p < .001 two-tailed). 
Status and Cognitive Tuning 
Cohen (1961) stressed caution in generalising from 
his results that suggested transmission tuning led to 
greater polarization of impressions than reception 
tuning. He says:-
"The proposition that transmission tuning 
leads to greater polarization might not hold 
true if it involved the expectation that the 
individual would have to transmit information 
to respected or well informed persons ••••• 11 
Experiment 2 attempts to investigate this caveat. 
In dyadic interaction it is to be expected that 
status will be an important determinant of how the 
interaction will be executed. From a functional 
viewpoint, that of maintaining status differences, it 
must be clear to both interactants, each others 
reinforcement pattern, the pattern being culturally 
prescribed for a given status position. It is the 
dynamics of dyadic interaction that serve to maintain 
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or change a given status relationship. The interpersonal 
interaction within the dyad can be conceived of as 
communication, at a less than explicit level, and 
seemingly irrelevant to the instrumental purpose for 
which the interaction was initiated. Although the 
details are expected to vary from one dyad to another 
depending on status, content of communication, and the 
idiosyncracies of the interactants, there seems to be 
an "accounting" process of how the interaction is going. 
It seems that, depending on the actual balance in the 
account and the culturally expected balance according 
to status differences, the interactants will present 
"self-images" (Goffman) designed to move the balance 
to the culturally expected ratio, and so maintain the 
status quo. While much of the information needed 
for this accounting process will be gained from 
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"proxemic" (E.T. Hall, The Silent Language and Proxemics 
1965 - for review see Current .Anthropology), dress 
(Hamid, 1969) and gestural cues, it is expected that, 
both interactants but particularly the low status 
interactant, vill also see himself being evaluated in 
the light of rhat he says in the instrumental 
communication. It was expected that different status 
relationships in the dyad ~ill invoke different tuning 
or organizing sets in the cognitive structures of the 
interactants. It was also expected that these different 
status tuning sets would interact in some unpredicted 
~ay with the sets of transmission and reception tuning. 
Experiment 2 was designed to test these two last 
propositions. It must be noted that in operationalization 
of the high status conditions, two possible sources of 
status evaluation concern were confounded. It is 
likely that a "Professor of Psychology" (high status) 
would not only be perceived as having high social status 
in general societal terms, but also as having peculiar 
competence in judging people. Both of these attributes, 
it was expected would facilitate self evaluation concern. 
In summary then, the following hypotheses were subjected 
to empirical test. 
H10: That in a dyadic situation, the expectancy of 
communication (transmission and reception) with a high 
status other person will induce a suspension of evaluation 
(i.e. less polarization) that will not be found when 
the other person is perceived as having equal or lower 
status. 
i.e. operational terms. 
subjects in high status other person conditions will 
show less discrepancy in the number of positive traits 
checked and the number of negative traits checked than 
subjects in low status other person conditions . 
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H11: That status tuning will interact rith transmission 
tuning in a different way from interaction with reception 
tuning. 
i.e. in operational terms. 
there will be significant differences between the 
interaction of status tuning and transmission tuning 
and status tuning and reception tuning. 
Subjects 
EXPERD~ENI' I I 
METHOD 
41 
Students in the vicinity of the University of Waikato 
Library at the time of each experimental session were 
recruited to take part in an "interesting experiment in 
impression formation". No students enrolled in a 
psychology course were included, for two reasons -
possible familiarity with the "Prof'essor of Psychology" 
and possible sophistication in participating in psychology 
experiments. Both these reasons relate to the author 's 
interpretation of the polarization effect, that is, 
self-evaluation concern. There were 8 groups of 5 
subjects for all conditions. Each condition (or cell) 
was at the intersection of one of the three :possible 
alternatives for each variable controlled, that is, 
sex (male or female), tuning (transmission or reception), 
other person status (Professor of Psychology , high, fellmv 
student, low).4 
The Setting 
Three small adjacent rooms in a building containing 
lecturers offices were involved. The room mainly 
used, except for the Human Relations Area File, some 
chairs, a desk and a table, was otherwise unoccupied. 
The adjacent room in one direction was the Professors 
of Psychology study, the adjacent room in the other 
direction a lecturer's study which was borrowed for the 
testing . 
Procedure 
Having recruited subjects, this same sexed group 
of 5 were led from the library to the experimental 
building. If the group of subjects was in one of the 
high status other person conditions, they were shown 
the door of the Professor's of Psychology study (which 
incidently had the appropriate title on the door 
i . e . "Professor of Psychology", and were told that they 
would have to go through this door later , so they were 
to remember where it was . If the group of subjects 
were in one of the low status other person conditions 
they were shown the door of the other study and likewise 
told that they would have to go through it later, so 
to remember where it was. All groups of subjects 
were then led into the room between the two studies 
mentioned above for the main induction. Vhen all 
subjects were seated E introduced himself and said 
that a number of people in the Psychology Department 
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were conducting an investigation into impression formation. 
Otherwise the introduction was the same as in 
Experiment I . This change was made so as to make it 
appear to subjects that they really would be going in 
to see others and that it was not just a ruse, as in 
fact it was. 
All subjects were told: "You are going to hear a 
list of characteristics that apply to a fellow student . 
What I want you to do is listen to these characteristics 
and get a good idea of what kind of person he/she 
(depending on whether the group was male or female) is . 
Don ' t try to relate these adjectives to each other , 
just let them fill out your picture of this person. 
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Induction of Tuning and other person status 
Those subjects in the high status other person conditions 
were told: "After you have done this you are to go 
next door that way (E pointed in the direction of the 
Professor's study) where the Professor of Psychology 
is waiting •••• "; subjects in transmission were told, 
"to hear your impression of Kevin/Jan"; subjects in 
reception were told, "to give you his impression of 
Kevin/Jan". Those subjects in the low status other 
person conditions were told: "After you have done this 
you are to go next door that way (E pointed in the 
direction of t h e other study) where this student 
is waiting •••• "; subjects in transmission were told, 
"to hear your impression about Kevin/Jan"; subjects 
in reception were told, "to give you his impression 
of Kevin/Jan", as in the high status other person 
conditions. If subjects were not clear as to 
the instructions :particularly which student was which, 
the instructions were repeated until all were satisfied. 
"Right, here are the characteristics". E switched on 
the tape-recorder, which recited the contradictory 
traits. The same tape as used in Experiment I was 
used here. hen the ten traits had been recited, 
E switched the tape-recorder off and said, "Now just 
before you individually go next door there is a little 
booklet I would like you to fill out first" . At this 
point booklets (that had :previously been kept out of 
sight) were distributed and filled in by subjects . 
While subjects were filling in the booklets, E went to 
the appropriate study for that condition and carried 
out a conversation with a stooge, 7hich could be heard 
through the wall by the subjects . The conversation 
was brief and concerned the co-ordination of the 
supposed next part of the experiment, that is, the 
communication with the other person. This was done to 
reinforce the reality of the next part of the 
experiment to subjects. The following communication 
was directed to the subject first to finish his/her 
booklet; "Have you finished? - (word or gesture of 
assent by subject) - good, would you like to come 
through first". E led this subject, after leaving 
the room and shutting the door , not to the relevant 
study, but further down the passage, where E briefly 
informed subject of the deception. The subject was 
told that in actual fact he/she was not going through 
to meet the student or the Professor of Psychology , 
depending on the condition, but that subjects were 
made to believe that they were going to do this because 
this experiment involved the study of the distorting 
effect of expectations. The subject was told that 
he/she had been brought out to maintain the deception 
for the others while they were still filling out their 
booklets. \'Vhen the others were finished, he/she 
would be called back and the whole experiment would 
be explained to them. When everyone had finished 
and all the booklets had been collected, the first 
subject finished , was called back into the room 
for the group debriefing and explanation. 
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An interesting observation was noticed during the 
debriefing of the deception, both for the first subject 
finished and the group as a whole. Those subjects 
in both the high status other person and transmission 
conditions interaction showed distinct behavioural 
manifestations of tension release after being told 
of the deception, whereas subjects in other conditions 
did not show this kind of reaction but rather , simple 
surprise. The behavioural manifestations of tension 
release included sighs , increased diffuse motor 
activity such as moving around on their chairs and 
then assuming a more relaxed pose in their chairs and 
also laughing. The behavioural manifestations of 
surprise were smiles and looking at each other, 
although this latter indication might be interpreted 
as tension release. 
All groups were asked whether any subjects "saw 
through" the deception and none answered in the 
affirmative . As in the earlier experiment a plea 
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for secrecy was emphasized in the same manner and 
subjects were thanked for their co- operation. The 
measuring instrument was the same as used in Experiment I. 
Stimulus Trait List: - as mentioned previously this 
was the same as that used in Experiment I - in fact 
the same recording was used. 
Statistical Analysis: - as in Experiment I a X 2 
One Sample Test was used for the same reasons as 
mentioned in Experiment I . 
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RESULTS 
The Post Experimental Questions 
As in Experiment I, Question 1 failed to check on 
the success of cognitive tuning induction. In Experiment 
I this was attributed to the lack of sophistication of 
the subjects and possible ambiguity in the question. 
In this case the subjects were University students 
so that lack of subject sophistication can possibly 
be ruled out and the ambiguity of the question must 
be emphasized. That the question does reflect the 
success of the manipulation can be ruled out because 
of the kind of difference in the measurement of the 
dependent variable found between conditions. 
Question 2, as in Experiment I, but in contrast to 
Cohen's findings, no significant differences between 
transmission and reception were found in desire for 
more information. However , subjects in low status 
other person conditions desired more information than 
high status other person conditions. 
( ')(, 2 = 5.3 p < .05) 
As in Experiment I no significant differences were 
found between conditions on the 7-point rating scale 
of satisfaction in performing the task. 
Main Findings 
The overall results are summarized in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
MEAN POLARIZATION FOR INTERACTION 
BETVEEN COGNITIVE TUNING, 
SEX , J.Ll"ID 
OTHER-PERSON-8TATUS 
Other-person-status 
Cognitive Tuning Sex High Low 
Transmission Male 25.10 18.80 
Female 19.60 9.20 
Reception Male 20 .70 24.20 
Female 22 .10 24.30 
Not e. - N for each cell= 5 
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It will be remembered that there ere two competing 
hypotheses, one predicting lower polarization in high 
status other person conditions than in the low status 
other person conditions. The other predicted no 
difference in polarization between different other 
person status conditions. By referring to Figure 3 
we can see that the answer is not a simple one. 
The greater polarization in high rather than low 
status other person conditions within transmission 
tuning is significant . 
( ,X 2 = 4. 33 p < • 05) 
The difference in the opposite direction within 
reception tuning is not significant however. 
( ?l-2 = O. 04) 
It appears that the two competing hypotheses werentt 
the only ones in the running as they were both 
disconfirmed. For transmission tuning at least, it 
seems that a high status other person induces more 
polarization on the subject than a low status other 
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person. However , a break-down by sex is more illuminating, 
(see F ig. 3). Here it seems that transmission tuning 
allows the differences in the variables of sex and other 
person status their full effect on polarization, while 
reception tuning is not facilitative of these difference 
effects on polarization. From Figure 3 it is clear that 
high other person status induces greater polarization 
than low other person status, for both sexes, but only 
in transmission tuning. 
( 'X, 2 = 4 . 91 p <- .05). 
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FIG. 3 . Mean polarization as a function of cognitive tuning , 
sex , and status . 
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Within Transmission. For males the higher polarization 
with high other person status in comparison with low 
other person status difference is not significant 
( "X, 2 = 2 . 11 p < • 20 two- tailed) 
although it is in the right direct i on . For females the 
higher polarization with high other person status in 
comparison with low other person status difference is 
highly significant. 
( ')G 2 = 11 • 75 p <. • 001 ) 
As is made clear in Figure 3 there are no significant 
differences in reception tuning . Figure 3 also points 
up a sex difference in transmission that holds on 
both high and low other person status . Within high 
status other person conditions the difference in 
polarization between males and females is, however, 
not significant, 
( X, 2 = 1 • 54 n. s • ) 
although the difference in the same direction within 
low status other person condition is highly significant. 
( X 2 = 14. 63 p < . 001 d. f . =1 two tailed) 
Overall Differences . There was no significant difference 
between the overall polarization score of males and 
females although the difference was in the same direction 
as found for Experiment I . However , in transmission , 
the overall sex difference in this direction is significant . 
( ?(, 2 = 4 . 94 p < . 05 d . f.=1 two-tailed) 
Summary . It seems then, that differences in the other 
person ' s status do not affect the formation of impressions 
when the subject takes a passive role in the communication 
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process (i . e . hen the subject is a receiver) . However , 
when the subject takes an active role in communication 
(i . e . when the subject is a transmitter) the variable 
of the other person's status does not affect his impression 
of the issue of communication. fuat is more the status 
of the other person in the dyad has a different effect 
on the male subjects impressions of the female subjects 
impressions . At least we can say that females polarize 
their impressions less than males in transmission, and 
less than the average degree of polarization in reception 
tuning. 
DISCUSSION 
The fact that the differential polarization effect 
operated consistently across all other-person-evaluation-
of-I conditions attests to the potency of the organising 
function of transmission and reception tuning. (See 
Figure 1). It is also clear from the same Figure that 
perceived other- person-evaluation- of- I does influence 
both transmitters and receivers in the direction 
predicted by balance , but differently according to sex . 
These findings have some definite implications for 
balance theory . Vhen the balance model is used to 
describe interpersonal processes , rather than the 
cognitive structure concerned vith interpersonal 
processes, the tuning effects in communication must be 
taken into account . We would expect that this 
qualification vould have important consequences where a 
quantitative approach was taken (Cartwright and Harary, 
1956), and where the communication pattern in a given 
interpersonal situation was asymmetrical. For example, 
Ye would expect that a person who didn't speak much 
in a group discussion of a particular person, would 
hold a less evaluatively polarized opinion than a 
person who spoke a lot. We have here a classical 
chicken-egg problem - does a person not say much 
because he doesn't feel strongly about it, or, does 
he not feel strongly about it because he hasn 't said 
anything about it (and publicly conmitted himself to 
a particular vie¥point). Another important 
implication of this study is the possible distortion 
effect of our measuring instruments (a problem also 
found in physics). All our psychological instruments 
require an output of information from the subject. 
The subject is required to transmit a response to a 
request for some specific information. This distortion 
would not be a serious confounder if it operated 
consistently for all subjects in all areas of cognition. 
However, as Figure 2 illustrates, males polarize more 
than females in transmission of personality impressions. 
Assuming the generality of this finding , we would 
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expect this sex difference to have important consequences, 
for quantitative predictions at least, of the balance 
model . 
Reference to Figures 1, 2 and 3 indicates that on 
the whole , females polarize less than males. Also it 
seems that in Experiment I, apart from the aberrant 
female transmission score, sex differences in polarization 
are mainly quantitat ive, the profiles resembling each 
other across the different other- person-evaluati on-of-I 
conditions. It will be remembered that the stimulus 
trait list that was used in this study was considered 
contradictory in terms of both social desirability and 
meaning . The subsequent polarization scores may be 
considered in terms of resolution or irresolution of 
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this ambiguity . Alternatively , Lynn (1962), considering 
socialization, has suggested the following hypotheses: 
that females would demonstrate greater need for affiliation 
than males, and that females 7ould be more receptive to 
the standards of others than males. ·;:hether this study 
is classified as a cognitive, or a behavioural manipulation 
of an interpersonal process, seems to favour one 
explanation over the other. If it is regarded as a 
cognitive study then the intolerance of ambiguity 
hypothesis is preferable, but if it is regarded as a 
behavioural study then it seems that the acquiescence 
hypothesis is preferable. It is likely that this study 
confounds the cognitive and behavioural approaches. 
In regard to female transmission, the favoured 
explanation determines which of the three other-person-
evaluation-of -I conditions require explaining. If 
"intolerance of ambiguity" is favoured the U score is 
explained as follo vs: assuming that U conditions are 
more ambivalent for the subject than Land D conditions, 
assuming transmission tuning makes inconsistency salient, 
and assuming that females have a lower threshold for 
intolerance of ambiguity than males , then we would expect 
that the score representing the interaction of the variables, 
transmission tuning, female subjects and uncontrolled-
other-person-evaluation-of-I would be relatively polarized. 
If the acquiescence hypothesis is favoured , then the L 
and D scores are explained as follows : the relative 
nonpolarization of female transmission, where other-person-
evaluation-of-I is known, appears to represent an 
acquiescence to the opinions of others . These 
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interpretations are open to empirical test. 
The conf'irmation of hypothesis 2 , that U conditions 
are more like L conditions than D conditions in 
polarization, coupled with the finding for hypothesis 8, 
that overall, there was a tendency to attribute more 
favourability than unfavourability to I, provides 
evidence to justify the extension of the "positivity 
bias" to interpersonal relations. Hovrnver , the 
explanation of this bias in interpersonal relations 
is expected to be different from the explanation of 
the same bias outside the interpersonal area. While 
it seems that the positivity bias outside the 
interpersonal area is an expression of the valuation 
of a given structure, (Zajonc, 1968, p.3) it seems that 
the positivity bias within the interpersonal area is 
the concomitant of a particular interpersonal strategy 
or modus operandum, i.e. the assumption of good faith, 
until proved wrong in interaction with strangers. 
It may be that this interpersonal strategy assumes the 
importance of a universal norm. 
What was not investigated here is the interesting 
question of' whether communicants in a dyad prefer 
talking f'avourably or negatively about a person. 
Natural observation would suggest greater satisfaction 
from emphasis in discussion of I's bad points rather than 
his good points. Theoretically , one might expect the 
same observations; it seems that there is a social 
comparison process operating here that involves the 
"self". (Used in Secord' s ( 1969) sense) . One would 
predict that when interactants and low self-concepts, 
greater enjoyment would be gained from discussion of 
I's good points; vrhereas when the interactants had high 
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self-concepts greater enjoyment vould be gained from 
discussion of I's unfavourable points . When interactants 
differed greatly in self-concept the outcome is less 
clear but one would expect the lo7 self-concept 
interactant to submit to the higher self-concept 
interactant's deprecation of I. 
Now to consider Experiment II and the effects of 
status tuning on transmission and reception tuning. 
It is clear that hypothesis 10 was contradicted (not 
just disconfirmed), and the finding is more informative 
because of it. The following assumptions underlay the 
original prediction: (a) that subjects wished to appear 
in a favourable light to the other person, especially 
if the other person had high status. (b) that subjects 
wished to appear "intelligent" rather than "consistent" 
(if these tvo can exclude themselves and considering the 
experimental situation it is likely) to the other person 
(especially if the other person was high status and 
more particularly because the high-status-other-person 
vas a Professor and the subject a student). (c) that 
subjects would think that the other person would think 
intelligent people didn't polarize their impressions 
of people. Of these assumptions "(c)" is perhaps the 
most dubious, and probably the confounder of the prediction. 
If the subjects thought it was desirable to appear 
consistent (in the aim of appearing intelligent to the 
other person, assuming that students wish to appear 
intelligent to Professors) then we would expect him to 
polarize his impression of I, and so predict the actual 
outcome . However, the question remains open; was it 
the theory, the operating assumptions or its operation-
alization that was vrong? There is a fourth possibility 
that neither of these are wrong but Vihat is needed is 
a qualifying statement . 
The prediction that status tuning would interact 
rith transmission t u ning in a different way from 
interactj_on vi th reception tuning ·was nevertheless 
confirmed. It seems that only under transmission 
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tuning are differences in other-person-status salient . 
Returning to the original theory we find an explanation 
why. It vas stated earlier, in the theoretical discussion 
leading up to the derivation of the hypotheses, that one 
of the sources for evaluative information for the interactants , 
in the dyad, i as the others infor ation transmitted 
in the instrumental communication. That is , a person 
only gives information about himself avay hen he is 
active in the dyad . There is an old adage that 
"people only know that you are a fool \7hen you open 
your mouth" . In transmission tuning T is expecting to 
be active in communicating his information, or rather 
opinion , about I and so give information to R about 
himself rhereas in reception tuning R is expecting to 
play a passive role in communication and so does not 
give information to T about himself. Status evaluation 
concern (anxiety is too strong) is then, activated in 
transmission but not in reception . This explanation 
also fits in with the natural observation by E of 
subject ' s response to debriefing of the deception . 
Only those subjects in the transmission, high- status-
other- person condition shored obvious signs of tension 
release . 
Cohen ' s (1961) explanation of the communication sets , 
along functional lines is highly plausible . Hoiever, 
Experiment II indicates that this is at least, not a 
57 
sufficient explanation. It seems that the :postulation 
of a dynamic of self-evaluation concern, might more 
adequately explain the experimental findings. In 
addition to the experiments reported here , it is 
:pertinent to mention, that in an earlier study the 
author conducted, where the writing of a paragraph 
was taken as transmission, there was no difference in 
:polarization when the receiver's status was manipulated. 
The failure to elicit differences in relation to 
differential receiver status vras attributed to the 
subjects anonymity. In other words subjects did 
not have to identify themselves by putting their names 
to the booklets, and so as they were not going to be 
individually identified subjects felt no self-evaluation 
concern. Providing this explanation of null results 
in the earlier experiment is correct, we have support 
for the dynamic of self-evaluation concern as an 
explanation of differences in the polarization of 
communicated impressions. 
Had we been able to include the variable status in 
Experiment I, we could have examined the hypothesis that 
reciprocity will not be so important in unequal status 
relationships. Actually we have here 2 competing 
hypotheses . From the balance view - point, if an unequal 
status dyadic relationship can be translated into a 
negative unit-formation relation, then we would expect 
that divergence of relations in regard to I would be 
less important than in equal status dyadic relationships . 
This prediction of lessened reciprocity in unequal status 
relationships is also derivable from the findings of 
sociometry, in particular the lack of reciprocity in 
sociometric choices of "stars" and their choosers. 
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On the other hand we might expect this lack of reciprocity 
in unequal status relationships to be masked by that 
great hypothesis leveller, interpersonal ettiquette. 
In other vords we might expect a positive unit-formation 
relation between the t wo interactants from the simple 
act of having to communicate and maintain "self-images" 
throughout the duration of the communication. (Goffman 1956). 
We might also expect that this reciprocal respect for 
each other's self- presentations (Goffman 1956) to be 
facilitative of finding common ground (an area of 
agreement) so that the communication can be executed 
with a minimum of :psychological discomfort . This all 
seems reasonable. Ve might also expect that a feeling 
of deference experienced by the low status person in 
the unequal status dyad, might facilitate attitude change 
in the direction of the attitudes held by the high status 
person. This :prediction rests on the nature of unequal 
status relationships, but so does a contradictory 
prediction. That the social distance perceived between 
the two interactants by the low status :person, would 
inhibit attitude change in the direction of attitudes 
held by the high status person . Clearly this outcome 
is implied by the original prediction, i .e. that 
reciprocity will not be so important in unequal status 
relationships. Empirical vork on these theoretical 
relationships would prove illuminating. 
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CONCLUSION and SUliU.IARY 
It is clear that the seemingly powerful variable of 
evaluation in the balance model of perceived interpersonal 
interaction does not cancel the seemingly subtle effects 
of the cognitive tuning sets of transmission and reception 
in dyadic communication. It does appear hovever that 
for status effects to be operative, it requires the 101 
status person to be active in the dyad (transmission 
tuning). It appears that people tend to be biased 
touards favourability in evaluating others. This may 
be just a specific occurrence of a general set held by 
people to perceive their environments favourably , or , 
it may be a cultural (perhaps universal) norm of 
interpersonal ettiquette, or, it may be a concomitant 
of psychological economy in executing dyadic communication 
with minimum discomfort . 
Tvo important impications of this study were outlined. 
:There the balance model is applied to actual interpersonal 
processes, the tuning effects in communication must be 
taken into account. It seems that this qualification 
will be most salient where a quantitative approach is 
taken and ~here the communication pattern in a given 
interpersonal situation is asymmetrical . Also this 
study indicates that a distorting factor ·rhich s eems to 
operate ihen a person expects to transmit evaluative 
information , does not operate consistently for at least 
one important demographic variable , sex . Depending on 
the generality of this finding, the polarization effect 
of transmission tuning has important implications for 
psychological measurement. 
It seems that the 11 self-:process 11 ( self' concept, 
behaviouristically defined) is an important explanatory 
tool in a number of the observed effects reported in 
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this study . Goffrnan ' s (1959) study on "the :presentation 
of' self' in everyday life" seems to be too useful 
to be overlooked by workers in social interaction and 
communication. Also the usefulness of the functional 
approach is underscored in this :paper . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 The author is grateful to P. N. Hamid for his 
advice and suggestions . 
2 Each single- sexed batch of subjects formed 
impressions of a person of the same sex , and the 
persons that the subjects ex~ected to meet were also 
of the same sex. 
3 Had the deception come unstuck , an outcome for 
which E vas quite prepared for , E would have continued 
experimentation with the "as if11 instruction. 
4 It was recognised that both these categories, 
"Professor of Psychology" and 11univer s ity student" 
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would both probably rate towards the high end of a social 
status scale . However , within the university setting, 
the relative status difference vould become most 
pronounced. All that was required for this study was 
a perceived difference of status, polarities were not 
required although their use could ,ell provide 
interesting results in a later study . 
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